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NOTE
ALDEN V. MAINE: INFUSING TENTH
AMENDMENT AND GENERAL
FEDERALISM PRINCIPLES INTO
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE
INTRODUCTION

Judged simply by its text, the Eleventh Amendment prohibits
federal courts from exercising jurisdiction in one category of casesthose in which a citizen of one state or foreign country brings suit
against another state in federal court.' The Eleventh Amendment has
been construed, however, to deny federal jurisdiction in other categories, such
as those in which a citizen of a state brings suit
against that
2
3
state, a foreign country brings suit against a state, and a citizen
brings suit against a state in admiralty court. In each instance, the
denial of jurisdiction was predicated on the legal concept of state sovereign immunity.5 In the 1998 Term, the Supreme Court construed
the amendment in Alden v. Maine6 to prevent Congress from providing citizens of a state the right to sue that state in its own courts with-

I The text of the Eleventh Amendment reads: "The Judicial power of the United
States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. X See also Lawrence C. Marshall, Fightingthe Words of
the Eleventh Amendment, 102 HARV. L REV. 1342 (1989) (arguing that the Eleventh Amendment should only prevent federal jurisdiction over cases expressly described by the text of the
Amendment).
2 SeeHans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. I (1890).
3
See Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934).
4
See Exparte New York, 256 U.S. 490 (1921).
5
Sovereign immunity, originally an English common law doctrine, held that the
Crown could not be sued in its own courts. The doctrine was carried over to the American
colonies under British rule and became a part of American legal jurisprudence upon independence. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715-17 (1999). See generally Louis L. Jaffe, Suits
Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 -ARV. L. REv. 1 (1963) (tracing
the development of sovereign immunity in English common law and its subsequent transferal to
American law).
6 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
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out its consent.7 Although the Court cited state sovereign immunity
as its rationale, 8 a very different doctrine explains the outcome in Alden. The Alden Court infused Tenth Amendment and general federalism principles 9 into the Eleventh Amendment, thereby construing
the Amendment, textually limited to federal court jurisdiction, to bar
state court jurisdiction.
Alden presented the issue of whether nonconsenting states are
subject to suit in their own courts for alleged violations of the federal
Fair Labor Standards Act.10 Alden's holding, that Congress lacked
authority under Article I to authorize such suits, placed the future of
federal law enforcement against states in limbo. Moreover, Alden
will have far-reaching effects on the balance of power between federal and state governments.
This Note will analyze the Supreme Court's decision in Alden,
focusing on how Tenth Amendment and general federalism principles
impacted the decision and reshaped Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence,1 1 especially Alden's implications for the enforcement of federal law against the states and the balance of power between federal
and state governments. Part I of this Note will discuss the development of Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, following it through its
gradual expansion prior to the Court's 1996 decision in Seminole
Tribe v. Florida.1 2 This discussion will attempt to focus on how such
decisions have been influenced by and dealt with general federalism
principles. Part II will then analyze the Supreme Court's decisions in
Seminole Tribe and Alden to determine how the Court infused Tenth
Amendment and general federalism principles, and how such infusion
has changed the Eleventh Amendment's impact. Part III will criticize
this infusion as overly restrictive of the federal government's ability
7
8

See id. at 706.
See id. at 749 ("[A] congressional power to authorize private suits against nonconsenting States in their own courts would be ... offensive to state sovereignty .... ").
9
While there is little or no difference between Tenth Amendment and general federalism principles, a distinction between the two is made throughout this Note in order to distinguish between those principles when each is infused into Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence by
the Court. Compare Alden, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (infusing Tenth Amendment jurisprudence),
with Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (infusing general federalism principles).
'0 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1994).
I Although this idea was forcefully proposed over ten years ago by Professor Calvin
Massey, this Note attempts to show specifically and in detail how the language and rationale
used by the Supreme Court in its recent Eleventh Amendment decisions are influenced by Tenth
Amendment and general federalism principles. See Calvin R. Massey, State Sovereignty and
the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 61, 66 (1989) (suggesting that "both
the dimensions of [state sovereign] immunity and its constitutional anchor are more properly
found in the Tenth Amendment"). See also Melvyn R. Durchslag, Accommodation by Declaration, 33 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1375 (2000) (agreeing with Professor Massey's basic thesis); David
L. Shapiro, Wrong Turns: The Eleventh Amendment and the Pennhurst Case, 98 HARv. L. REV.
61, 62 & n.5 (1984) (making the same suggestion five years before Professor Massey, but only
in passing).
12 517 U.S. 44(1996).
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to enforce its legislation against states and of injured individuals'
available remedies against states. Finally, this Note will argue that if
the Tenth Amendment is needed to construe the Eleventh Amendment
to apply to state courts, Congress should be permitted to use its enumerated powers to subject nonconsenting states to private suits in
their own courts.
I. ELEVENTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE PRIOR TO INFUSION
Since 1890, there has been an ongoing debate about the history
of state sovereign immunity as it relates to the Eleventh Amendment. 13 Much has been written about this history, from both sides of
the argument, by members of the bench 14 and scholars.' 5 It is not the
In Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11-16 (1890), the Supreme Court held for the
first time that Article II of the Constitution did not alter the original understanding of state
sovereign immunity, according to which the states are not subject to suit without their consent.
The Court also held that Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), was incorrectly
decided and that the Eleventh Amendment's only purpose was to reaffrm the doctrine of state
sovereign immunity incorporated in the Constitution. Although this view of history has been
accepted by the Supreme Court, not all of the Hans Court agreed. See Hans, 134 U.S. at 21
(Harlan, J., concurring) (denying "assent to many things said in the opinion," especially "[t]he
comments made upon the decision in Chisholm v. Georgia").
14
Compare Alden, 527 U.S. at 727-29 (holding that the history of the Constitution
shows that state sovereign immunity is an element of constitutional design), with id. at 762-64
(Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing the incorrectness of the Court's analysis of state sovereign immunity history prior to the Eleventh Amendment). See also John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh
Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 2004
(1983) (arguing, from the perspective of a sitting judge, that the Eleventh Amendment "applied
only to cases in which the jurisdiction of the federal court depends solely upon party status").
IS See, e.g., CLYDE E. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN
IMMUNrrY at viii (1972) (taking exception to the traditional notion that the Eleventh Amendment exempts "the nation or the states, from unconsented suits by individuals"); JOHN V. ORTH,
THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES: THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 152 (1987) (recognizing "the need to limit sovereign immunity" under the Eleventh
Amendment); Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1427
(1987) (arguing that "no governmental entity can enjoy plenary 'sovereign' immunity"); William Burnham, Taming the Eleventh Amendment Without Overruling Hans v. Louisiana, 40
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 931 (1989-90) (arguing that Hans v. Louisiana does not stand for the
proposition that the Eleventh Amendment bars federal law claims); Martha A. Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines:Part One, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 515,
549 (1977) ("The eleventh amendment does not confer upon the states a substantive right to
enjoy sovereign immunity."); William A. Fletcher, A HistoricalInterpretationof the Eleventh
Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a
Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1130 (1983) (suggesting that the
Eleventh Amendment was adopted with the "purpose of requiring that the state-citizen diversity
clause of Article III be construed to confer jurisdiction on the federal courts only when a state
sued an out-of-state citizen"); Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment,
and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.. 1, 6 (1988) (arguing that sovereign immunity
should be "[u]nderstood as a form of federal common law" rather than as a "constitutionalized
rule" under the Eleventh Amendment); William P. Marshall, The Diversity Theory of the Eleventh Amendment: A CriticalEvaluation, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1372, 1395 (1989) (refuting the
claim that "state immunity from suit in federal courts was intended to apply only to cases
brought against the state in diversity"); John E. Nowak, The Scope of CongressionalPower to
Create Causes of Action Against State Governments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 75 COLuM. L, REV. 1413, 1468 (1975) (arguing that the Supreme Court has
13
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purpose of this Note to describe, analyze, or add to this historical debate.1 6 Instead, this section focuses on the jurisprudence of the Eleventh Amendment, specifically those cases in which federalism principles have
influenced the Court's Eleventh Amendment jurispru7
dence.1
A. The Supreme Court's FirstImpression
Although the Supreme Court held in 1798 that the Eleventh
Amendment was part of the Constitution,18 it was not until 1821 that
the Court first interpreted the scope and meaning of the amendment.
In Cohens v. Virginia,19 the Court decided whether it had jurisdiction
over a writ of error filed against Virginia by a citizen of that same
state. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Marshall held that the
Court did have such jurisdiction. 20 The Chief Justice reasoned that
the states had relinquished some of their sovereignty to the federal
government when the country was formed in order to create a federal
government with "ample powers" to operate for the benefit of the
people. 2 1 Furthermore, the Constitution granted "to every person
having a claim upon a State, a right to submit his case to the Court of
the nation. ,,22 Thus, fe
federal jurisdiction was necessary to provide individuals with access to an unbiased court "exempt from23the prejudices by which the legislatures and people are influenced.,
In so holding, the Cohens Court identified the general purpose of
the Eleventh Amendment as protecting the states from their creditors. 24 Chief Justice Marshall rejected the argument that its purpose
properly limited the scope of federal jurisdiction over suits against state governments); James E.
Pfander, Historyand State Suability: An "Explanatory" Account of the Eleventh Amendment, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 1269, 1275-81 (1998) (challenging the Supreme Court's broad interpretation
of sovereign immunity).
16 For a comprehensive summary and analysis of state sovereign immunity from
English common law through the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment (including a discussion
of the Constitutional Convention and the ratification debates), see MELVYN DURCHSLAG, THE
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT pt. I (forthcoming 2001).

17 Even when general federalism principles have not affected outcomes, the Court
has discussed federalism principles in other Eleventh Amendment cases, as well. See, e.g.,
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 445-46 (1793) (Iredell, J.) (relying upon the Judiciary Act of 1789 and English common law for the holding, but mentioning that dependence upon
state legislatures "for the execution of their own contracts" alleviates the need for private suits
against nonconsenting states).
18 See Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798).
19 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
20 See id. at 430.
21
See id. at 380-82. Later in his opinion, Chief Justice Marshall would also note that
the Constitution was a change in form and structure of government from the Articles of Confederation, deemed necessary so that the federal government was not forced to act through the
states but could "act on individuals directly." Id. at 388.
SId.
at 383.
2.
ld. at 386.
24 See id. at 406.
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was "to maintain the sovereignty of a State from the degradation supposed to attend a compulsory appearance before the tribunal of the
nation."
Thus, the Court held that the Eleventh Amendment was
only intended to apply to those cases "in which some demand against
a State is made by an individual in the Courts of the-Union. ''26 Chief
Justice Marshall recognized that preventing individuals from bringing
suit against states in state courts would change the relationship between federal and state authority to such a degree that it would "strip
the government of the means of protecting, by the instrumentality of
its Courts, the [C]onstitution and laws from active violation." 27 This
is the other side of the two-way street that is federalism: the federal
government possesses powers limiting the sovereignty of the states,
expressly granted to protect the rights and interests of individuals.
B. When FederalismPrevents FederalJurisdiction
Almost seventy years after Cohens, Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence changed forever in Hans v. Louisiana.2 8 Declaring
Chisholm v. Georgia29 a "startling and unexpected" decision, 30 Hans
held that a nonconsenting state could not be sued in federal court by
its own citizens. Interpreting the Eleventh Amendment broadly, the
Hans Court decided to "trust" the states to provide remedies for those
individuals injured as a result of a state's unlawful actions.
Furthermore, the Court declared that it was unwilling to judge
state decisions on whether to provide remedies for their unlawful
conduct. The Court opined that states were
called upon by the highest demands of natural and political
law to preserve justice and judgment, and to hold inviolate
the public obligations. Any departure from this rule, except
SId. Though Cohens dealt only with a writ of error against the state, Chief Justice
Marshall engaged in a general "consideration of the [Eleventh] Amendment." Id. at 405. Although this discussion may technically be dicta, it has greatly influenced the Court's application
of the Eleventh Amendment.
SId. at 407.
27

28

i

134 U.S. 1 (1890).

'
2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). Chisholm, decided prior to the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment, held that the "Constitution vests a jurisdiction in the Supreme Court over a
State, as a defendant, at the suit of a private citizen of another State." Id. at 421.
30 See Hans, 134 U.S. at 11. This theory, that the overwhelming negative reaction by
the states toward Chisholn proves that the Constitution was intended to preserve the states'
sovereign immunity, has been dubbed the "profound shock theory." 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE
SUPREME COURT IN UNrrED STATES HISTORY 96 (1922). It is still cited with regularity by the
Court. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 720 (1999) ("The Court's decision [in
Chisholm] 'fell upon the country with a profound shock."') (quoting I WARREN, supra, at 96
(1922)); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 69 (1996) ("[The Chisholm] decision created
'such a shock of surprise that the Eleventh Amendment was at once proposed and adopted."')
(quoting Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 325 (1934)).
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for reasons most cogent, (of which the legislature, and not the
courts, is the judge) never fails in the end to incur the odium
of the world, and to bring lasting injury upon the State itself.3
Although claiming that states would be punished for failing to correct
any injuries their unlawful actions might cause, the Court failed to
address how an injured individual whose rights are violated by a state
might gain compensation. The Court failed to address this issue because it felt that to do so would be intruding upon an area of exclusive
state authority and would disrupt the balance of federal and state
power.
The Court's Eleventh Amendment analysis was next influenced
32
by federalism principles in Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi.
The government of Monaco attempted to sue Mississippi in the Supreme Court to collect upon bonds the state had issued. Once again,
the Court expanded the Eleventh Amendment beyond its text, holding
that a foreign state cannot sue nonconsenting states in federal court.
In reaching this holding, the Court was forced to explain why state
sovereign immunity does not prevent suits by the federal government
or other states but does prevent a foreign state, a sovereign in its own
right, from suing a state without its consent.
In explaining this distinction between a foreign state and the federal government or other states, the Court relied upon the federalism
principles inherent in the Constitution's structure. In ratifying the
Constitution, states consented to federal jurisdiction over suits between states.33 Likewise, "it is inherent in the constitutional plan"
that the federal government can sue nonconsenting states; 34 however,
"[t]he foreign State lies outside the structure of the Union., 35 Therefore, suits against a nonconsenting state by the federal government or
other state do not disrupt the system of federalism created by the
Constitution, but subjecting nonconsenting states to suit by foreign
states would infringe upon state sovereignty. 36 The Court reasoned
that, to preserve the constitutionally created sovereign nature of
states, state sovereign immunity must prevent foreign states from suing nonconsenting states in federal court, just as the Eleventh
Amendment prevents individuals from suing nonconsenting states.

31

Hans, 134 U.S. at 21.

292 U.S. 313 (1934).
See id. at 328-29.
34 Id. at 329.
35 Id. at 330.
32
33

36

See id.
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C. When FederalismSupports Jurisdiction
Notwithstanding the denial of federal jurisdiction in Hans and
Monaco, the Court has refused to construe the Eleventh Amendment
as a bar to all suits against states. Instead, the Court, relying on federalism principles, has created exceptions to Eleventh Amendment
immunity. These exceptions allow suits against states to proceed in
federal court and in the courts of other states under limited circumstances.
In R.B. Pardenv. Terminal Railway of the Alabama State Docks
Department,37 the Court held that Alabama consented to private suits
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act when it began operating
an interstate railroad after enactment of the Act. 38 The "conclusion
that this suit may be maintained [against Alabama]," the Court
opined, "is in accord with the common sense of the Nation's federalism. ' 39 Because Alabama had left the "sphere that is exclusively its
own," it had subjected itself to federal regulation and
40 allowed the federal government to authorize private suits against it.
According to the Court, to hold otherwise would "bear the seeds
of substantial impediment to the efficient working of our federalism.' 41 The federal government's position in the constitutional
structure requires that it regulate in certain areas, and this includes the
power to authorize suits by private parties. 42 Therefore, to preserve
the Constitution's balance of federal and state power, the federal government must be able to authorize private suits against nonconsenting
states when the states venture into a sphere of federal authority, such
as interstate commerce.
The influence of federalism principles enabled the Court to create another important exception to the Eleventh Amendment in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer.43 In Fitzpatrick,the Court held that Congress, pursuant to its powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,
may subject nonconsenting states to private suits in federal court.
This exception was predicated on "[t]he impact of the Fourteenth
Amendment upon the relationship between the Federal Government
and the States." 44
37 377 U.S. 184 (1964), overruled by College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999).
38
See id. at 192. The Federal Employers' Liability Act authorized suit in federal

court against every railroad carrier engaged in interstate commerce by any individual injured
while working for such a railroad. See 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1994).
31 Parden, 377 U.S. at 196 (emphasis added).
40

Id.

1& at 197 (emphasis added).
See id.at 198 ('To preclude this form of regulation in all cases of state activity
would remove an important weapon from the congressional arsenal ....
41 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
41
42

44

Idat 453.
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The Fourteenth Amendment altered the constitutional balance of
power by expanding Congress's powers, thus causing a "diminution
of state sovereignty."'45 According to the Court, this shift in the constitutional system of federalism gave Congress authority, pursuant to
Section 5, to intrude upon states' sovereign immunity by subjecting
nonconsenting states to private suit. The Court continues to rely upon
the "impact" rationale when upholding this exception in current Eleventh Amendment cases.46
The Court also relied upon the constitutional structure in Nevada
v. Hall,47 holding that a nonconsenting state may be subject to private
suits in the courts of another state. The federalism created by the
Constitution "is not a union of 50 wholly independent sovereigns....
[Instead,] any one State's immunity from suit in the courts of another
State is [nothing] other than a matter of comity. ''48 As the Court
would later explain in Alden,49 because there was no agreement in the
constitutional structure "between the States to respect the sovereign
immunity of one another," 50 each state could determine whether to
respect other states' sovereignty. In Hall, California choose not to
respect Nevada's sovereignty and subjected Nevada to a private suit
in California's courts.
Despite this apparent trend of using federalism principles to limit
the reach of the Eleventh Amendment, in Atascadero State Hospital
v. Scanlon,51 the Court used federalism principles to extend the reach
of the amendment beyond its text. The Scanlon Court was presented
with the issue of whether, in light of the Eleventh Amendment's protection of states' sovereign immunity, the Rehabilitation Act subjected nonconsenting states to private suits for damages.52 In holding
that Congress had not subjected nonconsenting states to private suits
under the Rehabilitation Act, the Court required Congress to "express
its intention to abrogate the 53Eleventh Amendment in unmistakable
language in the statute itself.,
This holding was required because "the Eleventh Amendment
implicates the fundamental constitutional balance between the Federal Government and the States"54 "held by the Framers of the Constitution." 55 According to the Court, requiring Congress to "une45
46
47
48
49

so
51

52
53

nity to suit.
5

55

Id. at 455.
See infra text accompanying note 86.
440 U.S. 410 (1978).
Id. at 425.
See infra text accompanying notes 117-18.
Hall, 440 U.S. at 425.
473 U.S. 234 (1985).
See id. at 235.
Id. at 243. The Court additionally held that California had not waived its immuSee id. at 247.
Id. at 238 (emphasis added).
Id. at 238 n.2.
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quivocally express" its intention to abrogate state sovereignty ensures
the maintenance of this constitutional balance of federal and state
power.56 Thus, Congress may authorize private suits against nonconsenting states only pursuant to Section 5. 5 7 Therefore, courts ensure
that, in subjecting nonconsenting states to private suits, Congress has
not altered the Constitution's balance of power.
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. 58 was one of the last preSeminole Tribe Eleventh Amendment cases influenced by federalism
principles. In Union Gas, the Court held that Congress had the
authority to subject nonconsenting states to private suit in federal
court when legislating pursuant to the Commerce Clause.5 9 In reaching this decision, the Court relied upon the balance of federal and
state power, specifically holding that the Commerce Clause (like the
Fourteenth Amendment) "both expands federal power and contracts
state power., 60 Because Congress may authorize private suits against
states under Scanlon, to deny Congress the same power under the
Commerce Clause would unduly limit the federal power granted by
the Constitution. Thus, Congress does not alter the constitutional balance by subjecting nonconsenting states to private suit in federal court
when legislating pursuant to its Commerce Clause powers.
Parden,Fitzpatrick,Hall, and Union Gas illustrate the influence
of federalism principles in limiting the reach of the Eleventh
Amendment. When the Court, as in Fitzpatrick,finds that the constitutional system of federalism has been altered by expanding federal
power at the expense of state power, Congress's creation of jurisdiction (if legislating pursuant to this expanded power) over nonconsenting states does not affect the original federal/state relationship.
Likewise, when the Court finds that this original federal/state relationship includes Congress's ability to regulate the states, as in Union
Gas, Congress's authorization of private suits is held to be constitutional.
Additionally, when a state, like Alabama in Parden, leaves the
"sphere that is exclusively its own," thereby entering a "sphere" that
is subject to federal regulation, the state consents to private suits.
This does not alter the balance of federal and state power because
federal regulation of states in such a manner was part of the original
constitutional system of federalism. Furthermore, a nonconsenting
state could be subject to suit in the courts of another state, as in Hall,
because such jurisdiction does not alter the constitutional balance of
5

See id. at 242-43.

57 See id. at 243.
58 491 U.S. 1 (1989) (plurality opinion), overruled by Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517
U.S. 44 (1996).
59 See id. at 5.
60 Id. at 17.
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power. Such jurisdiction does not affect the constitutional system of
federalism because states were not granted immunity from such jurisdiction and, thus, there is no diminution in the power granted states
by the Constitution.
Conversely, when the Court finds that subjecting nonconsenting
states to private suit alters the constitutional balance of power, the
Court will prevent the exercise of such jurisdiction, even if that means
expanding the Eleventh Amendment beyond its text. The Court will
use the Eleventh Amendment to preserve the balance when Congress
attempts to expand federal power at the expense of state power, as in
Scanlon. Furthermore, even if there is no corresponding expansion of
federal power, as long as the exercise of jurisdiction over a nonconsenting state would alter the balance by decreasing state power or
sovereignty, the Court will expand the Eleventh Amendment beyond
its text to preserve the constitutional system of federalism, as in Monaco and Hans.
II. INFUSION BEGINS
Almost since its first appearance in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, Eleventh Amendment analysis has been influenced, although perhaps only slightly, by general federalism principles. It was
not until recently, however, in Seminole Tribe v. Florida,61 that the
Court infused general federalism principles into the Eleventh
Amendment to such a degree that it significantly altered Eleventh
Amendment doctrine and restricted federal enforcement powers
against the states. Thereafter, in Alden v. Maine,62 the Court further
restricted Congress's ability to enforce its legislation against states by
infusing general federalism principles and, for the first time, explicitly
incorporating Tenth Amendment principles into the Eleventh
Amendment.
Prior to Seminole Tribe, the Eleventh Amendment was not
viewed as an impenetrable restriction upon federal legislative power.
In most instances, Congress was able to use its powers to avoid the
jurisdictional bar of state sovereign immunity and subject nonconsenting states to private suit in federal court.63 After Seminole Tribe,
Congress may not use its Article I powers to authorize suits by private
individuals against nonconsenting states in federal court.6
In the wake of Seminole Tribe, there remained some question as
to whether Congress could, under its Article I powers, subject non-

61

62
63

64

517 U.S. 44 (1996).
527 U.S. 706 (1999).
See supra text accompanying notes 43-60.
See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 64-65.
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consenting states to private suit in the states' own courts. 65 Alden answered this question, holding that Congress lacked the power under
Article I to authorize private suits against nonconsenting states in
their own courts. 66 In Alden, the Court used general federalism principles, first incorporated into Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence in
Seminole Tribe, to restrict Congress's power to enforce its constitutional legislation, and then utilized Tenth Amendment principles to
apply what was previously a bar on federal jurisdiction to state court
jurisdiction.
A. Seminole Tribe v. Florida
To fully understand the Court's decision in Alden, a brief discussion of Seminole Tribe is necessary, as it can be argued that Alden
was an extension of Seminole Tribe.67 The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act ("IGRA"), 6 enacted by Congress under the Indian Commerce Clause, 69 allows Indian tribes to conduct certain gaming activities pursuant to a valid compact between the tribe and the state in
which the activities are located. IGRA imposes a duty upon states to
negotiate in good faith with a tribe to form such a compact. Congress
authorized tribes to bring suit70 in federal court against a state to compel performance of that duty.
The Seminole Tribe of Florida sued Florida in federal court for
violating IGRA by refusing to negotiate in good faith toward the formation of a compact. Florida argued that the suit violated its sovereign immunity and moved
to dismiss the71 complaint. Relying on the
,
Supreme Court's decision in Union Gas, the district court denied the
motion.72 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that the
tribe's suit was barred by the Eleventh Amendment, 73 and the Supreme Court affirmed the Eleventh Circuit. The Court held that Congress lacked the power under Article I to subject nonconsenting states
6
Compare Jacoby v. Arkansas Dep't of Educ., 962 S.W.2d 773 (Ark. 1998) (holding that Congress may authorize private suits in a nonconsenting state's courts), with Alden v.
State, 715 A.2d 172 (Me. 1998) (holding that Congress may not authorize such suits).
6
See Alden, 527 U.S. at 754 ("States retain immunity from private suit in their own
courts, an immunity beyond the congressional power to abrogate by Article I legislation.").
67
See id.
at 760 (Souter, J., dissenting) ('Today's issue arises naturally in the aftermath of the decision in Seminole Tribe.").
63 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-21 (1994).
69 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ci. 3 ("Congress shall have the Power ... [tlo regulate

Commerce with ... the Indian Tribes ....").
70 See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7) (granting jurisdiction to the federal district courts).
71 See supranotes 58-60 and accompanying text.
72 See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 801 F. Supp. 655, 661 (S.D. Fla. 1992) ("[A] majority of the Supreme Court in Union Gas held that Congress had the power to abrogate the
States' immunity under the Interstate Commerce Clause... ).
73 See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 11 F.3d 1016, 1027 (11 th Cir. 1994) ("[W]hen examined in the proper light, Union Gas is distinguishable from the cases before us and does not
govern our disposition of this issue.").
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to private suit in federal courts. 74 The most important aspect of the
decision for purposes of this Note is the Court's discussion of the
question: "Was the Act in question passed pursuant to a constitutional
provision granting Congress the power to abrogate [states' immunity
from private suits in federal court]?" 75 In answering this question in
the negative, the Court was influenced by general federalism principles in addition to its Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence.
The Court started its analysis by declaring that one of the main
purposes of the Eleventh Amendment was to prevent "'the indignity
of subjecting a State to the coercive process of judicial tribunals at the
instance of private parties.' 76 Although the Court did not explain the
importance of protecting states' dignity or further discuss its relation
to congressional powers under Article I, the concern for protecting
states' dignity greatly influenced its decision in Seminole Tribe.
Although the state dignity argument is an established part of
Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, 77 it is inherently a general federalism principle. The assertion that the Eleventh Amendment protects
states' dignity relies on the premise that the original structure of government recognizes states as sovereign entities in certain areas that
the federal government may not invade. This premise is central to
federalism: that the Constitution created states that are sovereign in
certain areas and that the federal government may not interfere
therein.78
The Court next discussed the only two provisions of the Constitution under which Congress had been deemed to possess authority to
subject states to private suits in federal court: Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause.79 In comparing the
two provisions-eventually holding that Congress could not authorize
private suits against nonconsenting states under Article I but could
under Section 5-the Court examined the way in which each affected
the Constitution's balance of federal and state power.
74 See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72 (1996).

7- Id. at 59. Prior to addressing this issue, the Court decided that evidence of congressional intent to subject the states to private suits in federal court under IGRA was provided
in a "clear legislative statement." Id. at 55. Additionally, the Court held that the Ex parte
Young doctrine was not available to support a claim against the governor of Florida. See id at
73-76.
76
Id. at 58 (quoting Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc.,
506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993)).
77 See, e.g., Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261 (1997) (discussing how immunity to private suits protects states' dignity).
78 This premise also appears to be at the heart of recent Tenth Amendment jurisprudence. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 912 (1997) (holding that state executive officials are not subject to federal direction); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 176-77
(1992) (holding that a federal statute which gives the state no option other than that of implementing federal law is inconsistent with the principles of federalism).
79 See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59. See also supra notes 43-46, 58-60 and accompanying text.
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The Court cited its long-held principle that the Fourteenth
Amendment, "by expanding federal power at the expense of,state
autonomy, had fundamentally altered the balance of state and federal
power struck by the Constitution." 80 Therefore, because Article I predated this expansion of federal power, Congress could not, using its
Article I powers, subject nonconsenting states to private suit in federal court. 8 ' To hold otherwise, according to the Court, would
82 "deviate[] sharply from our establishedfederalismjurisprudence.,
Although this was not the only reason given for the Court's
holding, it was arguably the central reason. The Court reasserted its
commitment to preserving, under Article IH, state autonomy and the
83
"'balance of state and federal power struck by the Constitution."'
Therefore the Court concluded: "Even when the Constitution vests in
Congress complete lawmaking authority over a particular area, the
Eleventh Amendment prevents congressional authorization of suits by
private parties against unconsenting States." 84
This rationale is heavily influenced by federalism concerns. Any
general discussion of federalism will include an examination of the
balance of federal and state power and how this balance affects the
ability of each to govern. 85 Accordingly, it appears that the rationale
for the holding in Seminole Tribe was the preservation of the system
of federalism created by the Constitution, except as explicitly altered
by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Further evidence of the importance of federalism in Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence is found in the Court's continued support
of Fitzpatrick. In Seminole Tribe, the reason stated for allowing Congress to use its Section 5 power to subject nonconsenting states to suit
was the Fourteenth Amendment's alteration of the "balance of state
and federal power struck by the Constitution. 8 6 This shows the importance of federalism in Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence-only
when the power of the federal government is expanded at the expense
of state power, thus altering the constitutional balance, is Congress
permitted to intrude upon states' immunity provided by the Eleventh
Amendment.

go Seminole Tribe, 517

U.S. at 59 (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455

(1976)).

R The detailed reasoning leading to this conclusion is that because the Eleventh
Amendment stands for, but did not create, the constitutional principle of state sovereign immunity contained in Article III, Congress cannot use its Article I powers to expand federal court
at 64-65.
jurisdiction beyond that contained in Article Ill. See id.
82 Id. at 64 (emphasis added).
83 See id. at 59 (quoting Fitzpatrick,427 U.S. at 455).
84

Hat72.

See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 627 (7th ed. 1999) (defining federalism as
the "relationship and distribution of power between the national and regional governments
within a federal system of government").
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59 (citing Fitzpatrick,427 U.S. at 455).
8
85
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Some commentators have noted the similarity between Seminole
Tribe and recent Tenth Amendment holdings, including their combined effect on federalism. 87 In New York v. United States,88 a Tenth
Amendment case, the Court held that the Constitution prohibits Congress from requiring state legislatures to pass certain laws or regulate
according to federal directive. Specifically, the Court held that the
portion of a federal statute requiring states to "choose" between two
forms of commands-neither of which could be independently imposed by the federal government-was an impermissible form of federal coercion and therefore unconstitutional.89
The Court cited two reasons for declaring the New York statute
unconstitutional. First, Congress did not have constitutional power to
"commandeer" state legislatures by forcing them to enact laws or
regulate. 90 Second, the Court held that the statute blurred the lines of
political accountability because federal politicians could take credit
for solving problems by enacting legislation, while state91 officials
would be subject to criticism for executing such legislation.
Five years later in Printz v. United States,92 the Supreme Court
read New York as a clear-cut rule against federal "commandeering" of
state legislatures and executive officials. Relying on this rule, Printz
held unconstitutional a federal statute requiring local law enforcement
officials to perform background checks on anyone attempting to purchase a handgun. The Court found this portion of the statute unconstitutional because Congress did not possess the power under the
Constitution to command (or "commandeer") state executive officials
to administer or enforce federal programs.93 The similarity between
Seminole Tribe and these two Tenth Amendment cases did not expressly infuse the principles established in New York and Printz into
Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence. Alden explicitly infused what
Seminole Tribe implicitly infused.

87 See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz
and Principle?, 111 HARv. L. REV. 2180, 2208-09 (1998) (noting, while analyzing constitutional federalism as a constraint on national power, that some of the rationales in Printz and
Seminole Tribe are similar); Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling Textualism and Federalism:
The ProperTextual Basis of the Supreme Court's Tenth and Eleventh Amendment Decisions, 93
Nw. U. L. REv. 819, 820 (1999) (observing the similarity between recent Eleventh and Tenth
Amendment decisions).
88 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
39 See id. at 175-76.
90 See id. at 180.
91
See id. at 181-83.
92
521 U.S. 898 (1997).

9-

See id. at 932-35.
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B. Alden v. Maine
The Supreme Court's next significant Eleventh Amendment
case was Alden v. Maine.94 The Alden litigation began before the Supreme Court decided Seminole Tribe, when a group of probation officers filed suit in federal court against their employer, the State of
Maine. Seeking compensatory and liquidated damages, the probation
officers alleged that Maine had violated the overtime provisions of
the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"). 95 Prior to the decision in
Seminole Tribe, the district court ruled that the probation officers
were entitled to some coverage under FLSA and were eligible to receive damages.9 6 After Seminole Tribe
97 was decided, the district court
dismissed the probation officers' suit.
Unable to gain compensation in federal court for the wages owed
them, the probation officers turned to state court. They argued that
Congress had, under FLSA and pursuant to its Article I powers,
authorized private suits for damages against states in their own courts,
in addition to authorizing suit in federal court. The state trial court
dismissed the probation officers' suit, finding that it violated Maine's
sovereign immunity.9 8 The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed. 99
The Supreme Court similarly affirmed, holding that Congress
lacked the power under Article I to subject nonconsenting states to
private suits in their own courts. 1°° The Alden opinion consists of
essentially five parts, only two of which are important for purposes of
this Note.'0 ' The first discusses how the structure of the Constitution,
history of sovereign immunity, and past Eleventh Amendment decisions combine to illustrate that "the sovereign immunity of the States
neither derives from nor is limited by the terms of the Eleventh
94 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
9' 29 U.S.C. § 207 (1994).
96 See Mills v. Maine, 839 F. Supp. 3 (D. Me. 1993) (holding that probation officers
are covered under FLSA because they are engaged in law enforcement); Mills v. Maine, 853 F.
Supp. 551 (D. Me. 1994) (holding that probation officers are entitled to liquidated damages
under FLSA).
97 See Mills v. Maine, No. 92-410-P-H, 1996 WL 400510 (D. Me. July 3, 1996),
aft'd, 118 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 1997).
98 See Alden v. State, 715 A.2d 172, 173 (Me. 1998).
99 See id.This decision conflicted with the decision of the Supreme Court of Arkansas. See Jacoby v. Arkansas Dep't of Educ., 962 S.W.2d 773 (Ark. 1998). The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. See Alden v. Maine, 525 U.S. 981
(1996).
100 See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,712 (1999).
101 The third part of the opinion discusses how federal law is still binding on states
and the various enforcement options available afterAlden and Seminole Tribe. This is examined
infra Part IlL The fourth part of the opinion merely states that Maine had not waived its immunity. The fifth part consists of a brief conclusion and response to the dissent. Neither of the
final two parts of the opinion will be discussed in this Note. While these three parts are technically part of the opinion, they did not impact the outcome or rule of the case, as both were decided in the first two parts of the opinion.
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Amendment."10 2 The system of federalism created by the Constitution's structure was a primary rationale for the Court's belief that the
original constitutional design included state sovereign immunity.
This alone illustrates the importance of general federalism principles
to the holding of Alden. The Alden Court, however, also relied upon
Tenth Amendment principles.
The Court determined that the Constitution's structure of government recognizes the states as sovereign entities:
Any doubt regarding the constitutional role of the States as
sovereign entities is removed by the Tenth Amendment,
which, like the other provisions of the Bill of Rights, was enacted to allay lingering concerns about the extent of the national power. The [Tenth] Amendment confirms the promise
103
implicit in the original document ....
The Court's reliance on Printz and New York further illustrates the
Tenth Amendment's influence on this section of the opinion.
The Court next discussed two ways in which the "federal system
established by our Constitution preserves the sovereign status of the
States. ' 04 First, the Constitution reserves a portion of the government's sovereignty to the states, as well as the dignity that accompanies such sovereignty. Second, it establishes a system of government
in which the state and federal governments exercise simultaneous and
equal authority over the people. Based upon these two observations,
the Court held that the states
05 "retain the dignity, though not the full
authority, of sovereignty." 1
This section of the Court's opinion is crucial to the final holding
of Alden. The Court first had to establish that the doctrine of state
sovereign immunity was not limited by the text of the Eleventh
Amendment. If the Court had been unable to show that the Eleventh
Amendment did not create, and therefore did not contain in its text the
boundaries of, state sovereign immunity, the Court would not have
been able to hold that states were protected from unwanted suits in
state courts, as well as in federal court. The Court chose also to rely
upon Tenth Amendment and general federalism principles for this
proposition. This argument seems very similar to the argument in
Seminole Tribe, except that Seminole Tribe did not rely upon Tenth
Amendment principles. In Alden, the Court employed the Tenth
Amendment principles enunciated in Printz and New York to extend
the protection provided states by sovereign immunity, which is es'02
'03

Alden, 527 U.S. at 713.

Id.at713-14.

,, Id.at714.
I5Id.at715.
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sential to the Constitution's system of federalism, to state courts. It
can hardly be considered coincidence that the Court extended the
Eleventh Amendment to state courts and relied upon Tenth Amendment principles in Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence for the first
106
time in the same case.
By infusing Tenth Amendment and general federalism principles
into Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, the Court concluded "that
the scope of the States' immunity from suit is demarcated not by the
text of the Amendment alone but by fundamental postulates implicit
in the constitutional design." 10 7 This proposition is essential to the
Court's extension of the Eleventh Amendment to state courts.
In the second part of the Alden opinion, the Court turned to the
issue of the case, "whether Congress has the power, under Article I, to
subject nonconsenting States to private suits in their own courts."' 0 8
To answer this, the Court examined the Supremacy Clause, the Necessary and Proper Clause, and its prior Eleventh Amendment cases to
determine what, if anything, about this issue had been decided before.
The Court held that the Supremacy Clause"' 9 does not automatically allow substantive law to override state sovereign immunity. It
cited Printz for the proposition that the Supremacy Clause only elevates federal laws passed in "accord with the constitutional design."" 0 Because the Court had previously determined that subjecting nonconsenting states to suit was not in accord with the constitutional design,"' the Court rejected the premise "that substantive federal law by its own force necessarily overrides the sovereign immunity of the States."' 1 2 In this discussion, the Court combined Printz's
prohibition against commandeering state governments with a concept
influenced by federalism, that the sovereign states cannot be subject
to private suit, to hold that the Supremacy Clause alone does not allow substantive federal law to subject nonconsenting states to private
suit in their own courts.
In examining the Necessary and Proper Clause," 3 the Court employed essentially the same approach used regarding the Supremacy
106 Cf.James E. Pfander, Once More unto the Breach: Eleventh Amendment Scholar-

ship and the Court, 75 NOTRE DAME L REV. 817, 821 (2000) (stating that "Alden's version of
state sovereign immunity owes as much to the process federalism of New York v. United States
and Printz v. United States as to earlier decisions on the scope of the Eleventh Amendment")
(footnotes omitted).
'0' Alden, 527 U.S. at 729.
'a' Id. at 730.
'09 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof.., shall be the supreme Law of the Land . .
n0 Alden, 527 U.S. at 731.
11 See supranotes 80-82 and accompanying text.
12 Alden, 527 U.S. at 732.
13 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 ("Congress shall have the Power... [t]o make all Law
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all
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Clause. The Court began with the maxim: a law that "'violates the
principle of state sovereignty"' is not a law proper for carrying Article I powers into execution.114 Combined with the principle that subjecting nonconsenting states to private suit violates state sovereignty-because it alters the balance of federal and state power-the
Court had reached its conclusion. Congress does not have, "by virtue
of the Necessary and Proper Clause .... the incidental authority to
subject the States to private suits as a means of achieving
objectives
15
otherwise within the scope of the enumerated powers."'
The Court also distinguished all prior Eleventh Amendment
cases suggesting that the Amendment was inapplicable in state
courts.' 6 In doing so, the Court struggled to distinguish Hall, which
held that California could subject the State of Nevada to suit in California state courts. The Court distinguished Hall on Tenth Amendment grounds: the Tenth Amendment granted states all powers not
expressly delegated to the national government nor expressly denied
the states. Therefore, because "the Constitution did not reflect an
agreement" 7 between the States to respect the sovereign immunity of
one another," states were permitted to individually determine whether
to respect the other states' sovereignty." 18 Regardless of whether this
distinction is valid,"19 it is undeniably dependent on the difference
between the balance of power between federal and state governments
established by the Tenth Amendment and that between the individual
states.
Based upon its examinations of the Supremacy and Necessary
and Proper Clauses and prior Eleventh Amendment cases, the Court
decided that the issue of whether Congress has authority under Article
I to subject nonconsenting states to private suit in their own courts
was one of first impression. In what is arguably the heart of its opinion, it next looked to historical practice and constitutional structure to
resolve the issue.
other Powers vested by the Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.").
114 Alden, 527 U.S. at 732 (quoting Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923-24
(1997)).

"5 Id. This conclusion illustrates how Alden allows Congress to create a right without
a remedy. This problem is further discussed infra Part I.D.
116 See Alden, 527 U.S. at 735-40.
117 It does not appear that the Court describes state sovereignty as an "agreement"
between the states and the federal government in comparable situations. Furthermore, if state
sovereign immunity is to be understood as a broad constitutional protection of states' "dignity,"
it does not appear to matter who is subjecting the nonconsenting state to private suit. Even if it
is a state that authorizes the suit, it still offends the nonconsenting state's sovereignty and dignity.
I Alden, 527 U.S. at738.
119 See Gary J. Simson, The Role of History in ConstitutionalInterpretation:A Case
Study,'70 CORNELL L. REV. 253 (1985) (criticizing the Court's use of history in Nevada v.
Hall).
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Prior to Alden, an absence of prior congressional practice of a
specific type had only been used in Tenth Amendment cases to show
that Congress lacked that specific power.120 However, Alden's discussion of congressional practice relied on an absence to show that
Congress lacked power under Article I to subject nonconsenting states
to private suit in state courts.
For this proposition, the Court again cited Printz to the effect
that, because Congress has passed many statutes in the past authorizing suits in state courts, none of which subjected states to suit, Con2
gress assumed it lacked such power to subject nonconsenting states.1 1
Furthermore, the Court quoted Printz to explain why recent federal
statutes authorizing private suits against states in their own courts did
not provide evidence of Congress's power to do so: "'they are of such
recent vintage that they are [not] probative... of a constitutional tradition that lends meaning to the text. Their persuasive force is far
outweighed by almost two centuries of apparent congressional avoidance of the practice."' 22
In using the structure of the Constitution to show that Congress
lacks the power under Article I to subject nonconsenting states to private suit, the Court looked "to the essential principles of federalism,' 23 focusing on how Congress's exercise of such power would
affect the balance of federal and state power. The Court reasoned that
to permit Congress such power would disrupt political accountability.
This may be the Court's most obvious infusion of Tenth Amendment
as this is the raprinciples into Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence,
4
tionale of New York v. UnitedStates.1
The Court began by holding that "our federalism requires that
Congress treat the States in a manner consistent with their status as
residuary sovereigns and joint participants in the governance of the
Nation."'25 The remainder of this section of the opinion is a discussion of how, by subjecting nonconsenting states to private suit, Congress has not done so.

'20 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 907-08 (1997). See also Jackson, supra
note 87, at 2187-90 (criticizing the Court's analysis of past congressional practice in Printz);
Pfander, supranote 106, at 823-24 (criticizing the Court's "argument from novelty" and noting
its origin in Tenth Amendment cases).
121 See Alden, 527 U.S. at 743-45. This argument ignores the fact that prior to Seminole Tribe, Congress presumed it possessed the power to subject nonconsenting states to suit in
federal court, so there was no need for Congress to enlist state courts.
12
Id. at 744 (quoting Printz, 521 U.S. at 918).
'2

Id. at 748.

124

This may also be the Court's least persuasive use of Tenth Amendment principles

in Alden. The argument is criticized infra Part I.A.
'25 Alden, 527 U.S. at 748 (citing Printz,521 U.S. at 935; United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549, 583 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188
(1992)).
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This appears to be essentially the same argument employed by
the Court in its discussion of how the concept of state sovereign immunity was an essential part of the original constitutional design. 2 6
The Court held that state sovereign immunity was essential to the
Constitution's federalism. Its importance to the balance of federal
and state power is illustrated and affirmed by Tenth Amendment
principles. Furthermore, because state sovereign immunity was part
of the original constitutional design, and the Tenth Amendment prohibits the federal government from exercising powers not granted it
by the Constitution, this protection from unwanted suit should not be
limited to federal court, but should protect the states in their own
courts. Thus, the Court used federalism to expand the Eleventh
Amendment beyond its text, and then used Tenth Amendment principles to support this expansion and apply it to state courts.
Once again, the Court held that one of the purposes of state immunity is to "preserve the dignity of the States."127 In all prior Eleventh Amendment cases in which the Court claimed to be preserving
state "dignity," the Court dealt only with state immunity from suit in
federal court.128 In Alden, however, the Court held that "a congressional power to authorize private suits against nonconsenting States in
their own courts would be even more offensive to state sovereignty
than a power to authorize the suits in a federal forum."1 29 The heightened offense, as the Court perceived it, would result because such
power "is the power first to turn the State against itself and ultimately
to commandeer the entire political machinery of the State .... Such
plenary federal control... denigrates the separate sovereignty of the
States." 3 '
In Alden, as in Seminole Tribe, it seems that this rationale is basically an argument that state sovereign immunity is an essential
method for preserving the Constitution's balance of power. While
preserving state "dignity" is an established rationale in Eleventh
Amendment cases, the argument is premised on the central principle
of federalism: the Constitution created states that are sovereign in
See supra notes 104-07 and accompanying text.
U.S. at 749. See also supra notes 76-78, for the suggestion that this argument is actually one based on concepts inherent in federalism.
128 See, e.g., Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 268 (1997); Seminole Tribe
v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 58 (1996).
129 Alden, 527 U.S. at 749. But see Vicki C. Jackson, Principleand Compromise in
Constitutional Adjudication: The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity, 75
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 953, 966-67 (2000) (citing Supreme Court precedent holding that it is
more deferential to state sovereignty to decide federal claims against states in state courts than
in federal courts).
"0' Alden, 527 U.S. at 749 (citation omitted). The Court listed other reasons that the
power to subject states to private suit in their own courts is offensive. See id. at 750-51 (listing,
as offensive, the potential threat to states' fiscal integrity, interference with states' creation of
public policy, and "unwarranted strain on the [s]tates' ability to govern in accordance with the
will of their citizens").
126

127 Alden, 527
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certain areas in which the federal government may not interfere.
Furthermore, Alden's use of this argument is influenced by Tenth
Amendment principles. Though the Court did not explicitly rely upon
the anti-commandeering rule established in New York and Printz, it
did employ the rule as a reason why congressional power to subject
nonconsenting states to private suit in state court is more offensive
than the power to do so in federal court.
Perhaps the most obvious use of Tenth Amendment principles in
Alden is the Court's use of the principle of political accountability. It
is a Tenth Amendment principle that political accountability limits the
means used by the national government to regulate states.13 l In its
discussion of the Constitution's structure, the Court held that when
Congress authorizes private suits against nonconsenting states in state
courts, it "asserts authority over a State's most fundamental political
processes, [and] strikes at the heart of the political accountability
so
1 32
essential to our liberty and republican form of government."
In New York and Printz, the Court discussed political accountability in terms of preventing the federal government from usurping
state legislative and executive powers by forcing states to implement
federal mandates. The problem, according to the Court, is that state
governments will suffer politically from citizen anger over what are
really federal programs. The federal statute at issue in Alden, however, did not raise political accountability concerns; it merely provided a federal cause of action for citizens whose rights have been
violated by a state. Nevertheless, the Alden Court argued that by
authorizing private suits against the states to recover damages, the
federal government avoids the political responsibility for its actions.
Therefore, subjecting nonconsenting states to private suits in
state court not only disrupts the balance of state and federal power
created by the Constitution, but it also disrupts the system of political
accountability inherent in the Tenth Amendment.
Overall, Tenth Amendment and general federalism principles
greatly influence current Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence. Prior
to Seminole Tribe, the Court presumed constitutionality so long as
Congress used its enumerated powers to intrude upon the Eleventh
Amendment. In Seminole Tribe, the Court prevented Congress from
using its enumerated powers to subject nonconsenting states to private
suits in federal court, in order to preserve the Constitution's balance
"3 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 920 (1997) (explaining that the Constitution establishes two parallel political systems, federal and state, each with a direct relationship
to the people).
132 Alden, 527 U.S. at 751.
"' See id at 751-52. This argument can only be understood if it is considered, as it is
in Alden, see id. at 755-56, along with the federal government's right to bring suits against a
state on behalf of individuals whose federal rights were violated by the state. Justice Kennedy's
argument is further discussed infra Part MlI.A.
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of federal and state power. Then, in Alden, the Court went one step
further, holding "that the States retain immunity from private suit in
their own courts, an immunity beyond the congressional power to
abrogate by Article I legislation."1 34 According to the Court, state
sovereignty, affirmed and further protected by the Tenth Amendment,
necessitated such an extension of Eleventh Amendment jurisdiction.
Itl. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCE OF INFUSION

The most obvious, and troubling, consequence of the Court's recent infusion of Tenth Amendment and general federalism principles
into the Eleventh Amendment is its effect on Congress's powers to
regulate the states. As a result of this infusion, the Eleventh Amendment prohibits Congress from using its Article I powers to enlist any
court to police state compliance with federal legislation. 3 5 Furthermore, the Tenth Amendment prohibits Congress from mandating that
the states use their legislative or executive resources to enforce federal law. 136
The cumulative effect of the Court's recent use of the Tenth and
Eleventh Amendments severely limits the means by which Congress
137
can regulate states in areas within Congress's Article I powers.
Therefore, despite the validity of applying FLSA against the states
and Maine's alleged violation, the only remedies available to injured
parties are injunctive relief, prohibiting the appropriate state officer
from further violating FLSA, or to enlist the federal government to
sue on the injured parties' behalf.138 Neither remedy is adequate; the
former does not compensate injuries, while the latter is an unlikely
occurrence. Thus, FLSA and similar statutes create rights for which
there are insufficient remedies.
Such is the incongruity between federal rights and available
remedies. As long as Congress acts within its Article I powers, it is
not a violation of state autonomy for Congress to force states to conform to federal standards. However, it is a violation of state autonomy for Congress, even if it acts under its Article I powers, to use any
court to enforce its constitutionally valid legislation against states.
Professor Durchslag has commented on this paradoxical jurisprudence: "If the Tenth Amendment is not read to protect the states'
autonomy because prior judicial decisions have granted such a wide
berth to Congress under Article I, the Eleventh Amendment will suf-

'34

135

Alden, 527 U.S. at 754.
See supra Part II.

See supra notes 88-93 and accompanying text.
See Durchslag, supra note 11, at 1377-79.
"8 See Alden, 527 U.S. at 754-57 (discussing an individual's option for relief against
a state following Seminole Tribe and Alden).
136
137

ALDEV V. MAINE

20011

fice to deny
Congress the power to enforce its policies against the
39
states.'
Professor Durchslag's comment is perfectly illustrated by the recent decision in Kimel v. FloridaBoard of Regents.' 4° In Kimel, the
Court was asked to decide whether Congress had validly authorized
private suits against nonconsenting states under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"). Previously, the Court had "held
that the ADEA constitutes a valid exercise of Congress' power...
[under] Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and that [ADEA] did not transgress any external restraints imposed on the commerce power by the Tenth
Amendment."'141 Notwithstanding and consistent with Professor
Durchslag's comment, the Supreme Court proceeded to hold that
Congress lacked thepower to subject nonconsenting states to private
suits under ADEA.14 One would think that logical arguments, sound policy, accurate
history, and constitutional text would support the decisions largely
responsible for this strange constitutional analysis, Seminole Tribe
and Alden. 43 Instead, these decisions are largely the result of the
Court's infusion of Tenth Amendment and general federalism principles into the Eleventh Amendment.
In completing this infusion, the Supreme Court has relied upon
four main arguments: political accountability, preserving state dignity
and fiscal resources, the "Hans argument," and the "balance argument." Of these four arguments, the first two are Tenth Amendment
and federalism arguments, infused into the Eleventh Amendment.
The third is based on what is largely considered erroneous history,
while the fourth is the result of Seminole Tribe and Alden's influence
on Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence. None of these four arguments are persuasive reasons for limiting Congress's enforcement
powers and preventing individuals from having a legitimate remedy if
their rights are violated by a state.
A. PoliticalAccountability
The argument that political accountability is destroyed when the
federal government requires state institutions to obey federal man-

139 See Durchslag, supra note 11, at 1379.

120 S. Ct. 631 (2000).
Id. at 643 (citing EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226,243 (1983)).
142 Id. at 640. The Court's decision focused almost exclusively on Congress' power
under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to subject nonconsenting states to private suit because
the Court had already established in Seminole Tribe and Alden that Congress lacked such power
under any other provision of the Constitution. See supraPart II.
143 But see William P. Marshall, UnderstandingAlden, 31 RuTGERS L.J. 803, 806
(2000) (observing "thattext, history, and policy do not etplain Alden").
'40
'"'
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dates originated in FERC v. Mississippi,144 and later rose to prominence in New York and Printz. It was not until Alden, however, that
the Supreme Court argued that the Eleventh Amendment reinforces
political accountability.' 45
Although the Court has varied its explanation of how the Eleventh Amendment reinforces political accountability, 146 its best argument is that by authorizing private suits against the states to recover
damages rather than suing the state itself, the federal government
avoids political responsibility for its actions. 147 Furthermore, according to this argument, important protections for the states are lost
when the federal government authorizes individuals to recover damages against states. In such cases, the individual's motivation is her
personal claim--concerns for the public good are not likely to be considered. Federal officials, the argument goes, are more likely to be
influenced by considerations of the public good because of the relationship between federal and state entities. Therefore, federal officials would not be focused on the possible gains available from litigation, but would be motivated by long-term enforcement strategies
and maintaining federal-state relations.
The political accountability argument is of limited value; it applies only to federal legislation authorizing private suits in state
courts. Federal legislation subjecting nonconsenting states to private
suits in federal court does not violate political accountability. When a

federal court orders a state to compensate an individual, the federal
government is in no way dodging political responsibility, especially
when the federal statute authorizing the private suit imposes the obligation on the state. Even when applied to federal legislation subjecting nonconsenting states to private suits in state courts, the argument
'44 456 U.S. 742, 775 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See generally Eric M. Jensen & Jonathan L. Entin, Commandeering, the Tenth Amendment, and
the FederalRequisition Power: New York v. United States Revisited, 15 CONST. COMMENTARY
355 (1998) (examining the historical basis for political accountability); H. Jefferson Powell, The
Oldest Question of ConstitutionalLaw, 79 VA. L. REV. 633 (1993) (analyzing the validity of
political accountability).
14s Cf William P. Marshall & Jason S. Cowart, State Immunity, PoliticalAccountability, and Alden v. Maine, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1069 (2000) (addressing whether the
political accountability argument as used in Alden supports the decision in Alden).
146 The Court relates the issue of political accountability to federal and judicial interference with the state budgetary/fiscal process at two points in its Alden opinion. See Alden v.
Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 751 (1999) ("If the principle of representative government is to be preserved to the States, the balance between competing [legislative claims for compensation] must
be reached after deliberation by the political process established by the citizens of the States, not
by judicial decree mandated by the Federal Government and invoked by the private citizen.");
id. at 752 ("A State is entitled to order the processes of its own governance, assigning to the
political branches, rather than the courts, the responsibility for directing the payment of debts.").
This argument is discussed infra Part lH.B.
147 See Alden, 527 U.S. at 756 ("Suits brought by the United States itself require the
exercise of political responsibility for each suit prosecuted against a State, a control which is
absent from a broad delegation to private persons to sue nonconsenting States.").
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that the Eleventh Amendment reinforces political accountability is
flawed for two reasons.
First, forcing a state into court under federal legislation impairs
political accountability without respect to the relief sought. If, as according to Alden, subjecting nonconsenting states to private suits in
state courts violates political accountability, nonconsenting states
should never be subject to private suits authorized by federal legislation. This is not the case, however. States are still subject to private
suits brought to obtain injunctive relief against state officials based
upon federal law. Not only should political accountability concerns
apply equally, regardless of the relief sought by the individual, but
violate political accountability issues
prospective relief might actually
148
more than damage relief.
Prospective relief may be more intrusive because an injunction
against a state officer prevents the state from enforcing its own policies, directly interfering with the structure of political responsibility
by nullifying the state legislative decision. On the other hand, an individual who successfully sues the state does not directly interfere
with political accountability. 149 When an individual receives damages
from a state, although interfering with political accountability by
forcing the state to pay the individual money originally allocated for
other purposes, the state still has the ability to choose where the
money to pay damages comes from and to do so consistent with prior
state legislative decisions. When an individual gains an injunction
against a state officer, however, the state must follow the court's order, completely nullifying state autonomy.
Second, the Court's political accountability argument in Alden
can only be understood when considered with the exception that allows the federal government to sue the states on behalf of individuals
for prospective and retroactive relief. 50 This explanation of the argument actually creates a system of two-level accountability. Congressional enactment of the law creates the first level, subjecting nonconsenting states to private suits for damages and protecting certain
rights of individuals. The second level is then imposed when the federal executive branch enforces the law by bringing suit against the
state.' 5 '

148

See William A. Fletcher, The Eleventh Amendment: Unfinished Business, 75

NoTRE DAME L REv. 843, 847 (2000) (arguing that affirmative injunctions, those ordering state
officers to perform specific acts, are the most intrusive form of relief, when considered in terms
of common law and equitable doctrines).
149 See Marshall, supra note 143, at 824 (explaining that suits for damages do not
threaten state survival).
,50 See Durchslag, supranote 11, at 1382.
,
151 See id.
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B. State Dignity and FiscalResources
Another of the Supreme Court's arguments in Seminole Tribe
and Alden is that the Eleventh Amendment protects states' fiscal resources and dignity. In other words, by preventing individuals from
recovering monetary damage awards against nonconsenting states, the
Eleventh Amendment allows states to decide how to allocate public
fiscal resources. 152 Also, in both cases, the Court argued that when a
nonconsenting state is made subject to suit by federal law, the dignity
of the state is violated. Both of these arguments are extremely underinclusive and thus flawed.
The argument that Alden protects state fiscal resources and allows state governments to make difficult decisions regarding the allocation of public resources is under-inclusive. t53 There are too many
ways in which state fiscal resources and decision-making abilities are
subject to federal invasion for this argument to be persuasive. Alden
expressly approved actions brought under federal legislation enacted
pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment or directly by the
federal government.1 54 Actions brought by individuals seeking injunctive relief, if successful, could possibly cost the state more money
in adjusting their policies than actions seeking damages.1 55 Furthermore, states may be sued in the courts of other states.
Even private
suits for damages, not directly against the state itself, 157 could end up
invading state fiscal resources, if the state chooses to indemnify their
officers or assume some of the liable municipalities' costs. Therefore, if protecting states' fiscal resources is the purpose of the Eleventh Amendment, the limited immunity provided in Seminole Tribe
and Alden will not accomplish that purpose.
The argument that the Eleventh Amendment preserves states'
dignity is also extremely under-inclusive. According to the Court's
152 See Alden, 527 U.S. at 750 ("The potential national power would pose a severe and
notorious danger to the States and their resources.").
153 But see Marshall, supra note 15, at 1385-87 (arguing that the most important pur-

pose of the Eleventh Amendment, and that purpose best supported by history, is to protect the
states' fiscal integrity and their right to decide how to allocate such resources).
"4
See Alden, 527 U.S. at 756 ("[I]n adopting the Fourteenth Amendment, the people
required the States to surrender a portion of their sovereignty that had been preserved to them by
the original Constitution, so that Congress may authorize private suits against nonconsenting
States pursuant to its § 5 enforcement power.").
155 Cf Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 682 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (arguing
that "the nature of the impact on the state treasury is precisely the same" when an injunction is
granted as it is when a damage award is assessed); but cf id. at 668 (majority opinion) (replying
to Douglas that "[s]uch an ancillary effect on the state treasury is a permissible and often an
inevitable consequence of the principle announced in Ex parte Young").
156 See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
157 See Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (holding that a state officer acting as
an
agent of the state is not immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment); Lincoln County v.
Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890) (holding that cities and political subdivisions are not immune from
suit).
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reasoning, states' dignity is equally violated by a state being subject
to suit in another state's court, at the hands of the federal government,
or under federal law enacted pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, as it would by an individual suing pursuant to federal
law enacted under Congress's Article I powers. Furthermore, it is
difficult to understand how states' dignity is violated when it is sued
in its own courts. If states are protected from suit in federal court yet
subject to suits in their own state courts, they gain considerable protections for their dignity. For example, states will have the luxury of
havingb 8 their own judges and, possibly more importantly, procedures
used.
The Court is not asking the correct question when it makes these
arguments about protecting state fiscal resources and dignity through
the Eleventh Amendment. The Court should ask whether these concers are sufficient to justify depriving injured individuals of the
ability to seek compensation. In Alden, not only were the probation
officers injured by the state and denied compensation, but they had,
theoretically, succeeded politically in gaining federal protection and
remedies against the states. Asking this question most likely requires
the Court to adopt a balancing test in Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence and change its current policy of simply ruling in favor of the
states.'5 9
C. The Hans Argument
The Hans argument is based upon an interpretation of the history
of state sovereign immunity history prior to the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment. The Supreme Court in Hans adopted this interpretation, holding that the Eleventh Amendment merely reaffirmed Article I and thus did not alter the original understanding of state sovereign immunity. 160 According to this original understanding, states are
not subject to suit without their consent. Furthermore, this understanding, preserved by Article III, would be of no import if Congress
could, under Article I, create jurisdiction that subjects nonconsenting
states to private suit.
Assuming that Hans was correctly decided, this argument is
powerful support for Seminole Tribe. If Article il does not grant
federal courts jurisdiction over private suits brought against noncon-

158 See Employees of Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health &
Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 288-89 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring) (noting that state judicial procedures may protect that dignity of a state).
159 See Durchslag, supra note 11, at 1394-97 (suggesting the adoption of a balancing
test in Eleventh Amendment law).
.
160 See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
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senting states, Congress, according to Marbury v. Madison, 61 does
not possess the authority to expand the jurisdiction of the federal
courts to include such cases. Although there has been a great deal of
debate regarding Hans, the Court has largely ignored such debate, and
Hans has been binding authority for more than a century. Furthermore, the current majority of the Court does not seem to have any
inclination to revisit Hans. Even assuming Hans was correctly decided, this argument has at least one major flaw preventing it from
being sufficient to justify the enforcement problem created by Seminole Tribe and Alden.
This argument's biggest flaw is the Court's creation of exceptions to Eleventh Amendment immunity. It is nonsensical to hold that
a state's sovereign immunity is violated when called into federal
court, but not when it is called into another state's courts. If defending actions in a foreign jurisdiction violates state sovereign immunity,
then it should not matter whether the foreign jurisdiction is a federal
court or a court in another state. Either way, a nonconsenting state is
subject to suit in the courts of another sovereign.
It is similarly nonsensical to argue that a state's sovereign immunity is violated when called into federal court to defend against
allegations brought by an individual, but not when the federal government, acting on behalf of the individual, forces the state to defend
against those allegations. 62 According to the Hans argument, a
state's sovereign immunity is violated when it is forced to defend its
actions in a foreign jurisdiction. Therefore, it should not matter if the
opposing party is the federal government or an individual, especially
when identical claims would be asserted. In both instances, the state,
without its consent, is called into a foreign jurisdiction and forced to
stand trial against the same allegations.
Finally, it does not make sense that a state's sovereign immunity
is violated when sued under legislation enacted pursuant to Congress's Article I powers, but not when sued under legislation enacted
pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.163 The main
rationale of the Hans argument is that a state's sovereign immunity is
violated whenever it is subjected to private suit in federal courts,
without its consent. Accordingly, it should not matter under which
161 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803) ("If congress remains at liberty to give this
court appellate jurisdiction, where the constitution has declared their jurisdiction shall be original; and original jurisdiction where the constitution has declared it shall be appellate; the distribution of jurisdiction made in the constitution, is form without substance.").
162 See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (reaffirming the ability of the federal
government to sue nonconsenting states on behalf of individuals).
'63
See id. at 756 (asserting the ability of Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity
in federal court under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445
(1976) (holding that Congress may subject nonconsenting states to private suit in federal court
under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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power Congress is legislating when authorizing private suits against
nonconsenting states. Regardless of whether Congress is acting pursuant to Article I or Section 5, the nonconsenting state is still subjected to private suits in federal court.
The effect of these exceptions can be partially explained in one
of two ways. Either the Eleventh Amendment, in protecting state
sovereign immunity, is extremely under-inclusive, or the Eleventh
Amendment cannot be justified by claiming that it protects sovereign
immunity. In either case, the Hans argument fails to support the
Court's denial, in Seminole Tribe and Alden, of a remedy to individuals whose rights have been violated.
A lesser flaw, at least in respect to Alden's holding, is the limited
historical evidence cited by the Court. The Court discussed how history shows that states did not waive their sovereign immunity to suit
in federal court when they ratified the Constitution and joined the
United States. This history does not answer, let alone even mention,
the issue of whether Congress, when acting pursuant to constitutionally legal powers, can subject nonconsenting states to suits in their
own courts. 164
The Alden Court attempts to cover this flaw by arguing that if
Congress thought it possessed the power to subject nonconsenting
states to private suits in state courts, it would have exercised this
power long ago. 165 This cover is unpersuasive, however-until Seminole Tribe in 1996, Congress thought it could authorize private suits
in federal court against nonconsenting states, 16 6 obviating any reason
for Congress to resort to state courts. Therefore, the Hans argument
is poor support for Alden. To support Seminole Tribe, the Court
could have relied upon the history adopted in Hans, but it did not do
so, instead relying on general federalism principles.
D. The Balance Argument
The final, and arguably most persuasive, argument used to justify the holdings in Seminole Tribe and Alden is that Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence creates an acceptable balance between
federal supremacy and state sovereignty. 67 It does so by providing
remedies for the most important federal rights, while preserving the
164 Cf. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 907-08 (1997) (distinguishing between

the federal government commandeering state executive processes, which is unconstitutional,
and commandeering state courts, which is constitutional because of the Supremacy Clause).
'65 See Alden, 527 U.S. at 743-45.
166 See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
'67 While this argument is not expressly made in either Seminole Tribe or Alden, it is
implied in both cases when the Court discusses how there are still enforcement options available
to prevent the states from violating federal law. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 754-57; Seminole Tribe
v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,73-76 (1996).
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authority and status of the sovereign states. This argument is largely
based on the three primary exceptions to the Eleventh Amendment:
(1) allowing individuals to gain an injunction to prevent state officials
from violating federal law,r68 (2) allowing the federal government to
enforce federal law by suing states, 169 and (3) allowing Congress to
subject nonconsenting states to private suits under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.1 70 Furthermore, these exceptions are only
necessary when states have chosen to violate federal law-which the
Court is "unwilling to assume" 17 1-and no state remedy is provided.
Essentially, this argument can be172summed up as "the system ain't
broke so there is no need to fix it."

However, this argument begs the question: is the system really
not broken-that is, does it work? An injunction does not provide a
remedy providing adequate compensation to an individual whose
rights were violated.173 Furthermore, it seems politically and administratively unlikely that the federal government will sue states on behalf of individuals. Politically, an agency suing a state on behalf of
an individual is likely to suffer congressional backlash. 74 Administratively, the federal government does not possess the resources to
investigate, let alone commence an action for, each allegation of state
violation of individuals' federal rights. Moreover, it has been suggested that the Court might remove the federal government's ability

to sue on behalf of individuals, 175 as it has done with states. 176 Fi-

nally, the Court seems to be on course for restricting Congress's ability to use Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to subject nonconsenting states to private suits, 177 thus eliminating even more remedies

available to individuals against states.
An example of how the system created by the Eleventh Amendment "works" can be found in Alden. In the case of the probation
officers, the State of Maine violated federal law by not paying suffiSee Exparte Young, 204 U.S. 123, 167 (1908).
See United States v. Texas, 193 U.S. 621, 624-26 (1892).
See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445,456 (1976).
17' Alden, 527 U.S. at 756.
72 Durchslag, supra note 11, at 1386.
73 See generally Vicki C. Jackson, Seminole Tribe, the Eleventh Amendment, and the
PotentialEviscerationof Ex parte Young, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 495 (1997) (analyzing Seminole
Tribe's effect upon the Exparte Young exception to the Eleventh Amendment).
'74 See Durchslag, supra note 11, at 1387-88.
'75 See id.; Massey, supra note 11, at 68.
176 See New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76 (1883) (holding that the Eleventh
Amendment barred cases where a state attempted to sue another state on behalf of its citizens
because the real parties in interest were the individuals, not the plaintiff state).
77 See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say. Bank, 527
U.S. 627 (1999) (holding that Congress' power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is to be
construed narrowly); see also Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Eleventh Amendment Schizophrenia, 75
NoTRE DAME L. REV. 859, 860-61 (2000) (suggesting that the Court may narrow alternative
mechanisms of relief).
'68
'69
170
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cient overtime wages-the two district court rulings made before
Seminole Tribe was decided make it clear that Maine had, in fact,
violated the FLSA. 178 If state remedies were available to the probation officers, they would not have been forced to first sue in federal
court and then sue in state court under a federal cause of action.
There was no reason to seek an injunction against the appropriate
state official, as it would not compensate them for their back pay.
Obviously, the federal government did not sue on their behalf and the
rights they sought to enforce were not covered by Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, a group of individuals, granted
the right to overtime pay by Congress, had their federal rights violated by the State of Maine without a means for receiving compensation for their losses. It appears from this example that perhaps the
system is broken.
E. The Tenth Amendment
The Court's most persuasive argument to support the effect of
Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence on federal enforcement power is
that, because it protects states while allowing enforcement of individuals' most important constitutional rights, it should not be
changed. The current criticism of this argument, that it is based on a
false premise (that the system works), is subject to subjective individual interpretation of current Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence. It is
possible that reasonable people may disagree on whether the system
works and, therefore, disagree on whether Seminole Tribe and Alden
were "correctly" decided. It may be that the Court, by infusing Tenth
Amendment principles into the Eleventh Amendment, has in fact provided a less subjective rebuttal to the balance argument and provided
further proof that Alden was wrong.
The Tenth Amendment reserves to the states all powers neither
granted to the federal government nor prohibited to the states by the
Constitution. 7 9 While this amendment stands for the "truism" that
states possess sovereign powers that cannot be infringed by the federal government acting unconstitutionally, 8 ° it also stands for the
proposition that the federal government can intrude upon states' sovereiguty by using powers granted in the Constitution.
Assuming, as is argued here, the Court did infuse the Tenth
Amendment principles into Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence and
relied on those principles in applying the Eleventh Amendment to
state courts, it would appear that Congress should be able to use its
178

See supranote 96.

The Tenth Amendment states: 'The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
179

the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.

180 See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
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enumerated powers to intrude upon states' Eleventh Amendment sovereignty from suit, as long as such suit is limited to the state's own
courts. In its simplest form, the argument is that state sovereign immunity in a state's own courts, if in fact preserved by the Tenth
Amendment, is subject to Congress's enumerated powers. Thus,
Congress, pursuant to its enumerated powers, and under the Necessary and Proper Clause, can subject nonconsenting states to private
suits in their own courts. Therefore, Alden was incorrectly decided.
Although the Eleventh Amendment is part of the Constitution, it is
limited by its text to apply to only federal court jurisdiction and,
therefore, should not be expanded to prevent such jurisdiction in state
courts.
Congress's ability to subject nonconsenting states to private suits
in state court is not inconsistent with current Tenth Amendment jurisprudence. When exercised, Congress has not usurped state legislative
power. Instead, Congress has, acting pursuant to powers expressly
granted it under the Constitution, provided a federal remedy for individuals against states that violate federally guaranteed rights. Because a federal statute is being employed to provide the remedy, the
federal government will be politically accountable for its actions.
Furthermore, the state being sued would be provided protections
inherent in its own judicial system-use of the states' judges, judicial
procedures, and rules. Forcing individuals to sue the state in its own
courts would not alter the constitutional balance of state and federal
power because of the protections afforded the state by its own judicial
system. In fact, Professor Jackson has argued that Supreme Court
precedent holds that it is more deferential to state sovereignty for state
courts to decide federal claims against the states in state courts rather
than in federal courts. 181 Therefore, allowing Congress to authorize
such suits would be consistent with the Court's recent infusion of
general federalism principles into Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, and its accompanying concern for preserving the Constitution's balance of federal and state power.
Finally, permitting Congress this power would solve the enforcement problems created by Seminole Tribe and Alden. Congress
would have a constitutionally permissible means-Article I-to exercise its powers against states. This may also eliminate the need for
many of the exceptions that have evolved throughout the history of
Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence.
The Court could respond that the Constitution does not in fact
grant Congress the power to subject nonconsenting states to private
suits, regardless of the forum in which the suit is brought. According
to the Court, state sovereign immunity is part of the original constitu181 See Jackson, supra note 129, at 966-67.
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tional design. Not only is this argument circular, but it is also persuasive only if the view of history advanced in Alden is accepted. However, four current Justices 182 and an overwhelming majority of scholars183 find this history incorrect. Therefore, it seems that by allowing
Congress, pursuant to its Article I powers, to subject nonconsenting
states to private suits in their own courts, the Court will be able to
preserve the balance of state and federal power created by the Constitution (which seems to be the current goal of Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence) and provide individuals a remedy under federal law
against states.
CONCLUSION

Prior to Seminole Tribe and Alden, Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence started with the presumption that Congress, acting pursuant
to its enumerated powers, could intrude upon states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity from suit. This presumption was necessary to
protect individuals' federal rights against states that in many instances
were unwilling to adopt regulatory programs consistent with national
policy. Beginning in Seminole Tribe, however, the Court shifted its
focus in Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence from the protection of
individual rights to the balance of federal and state power.
In Seminole Tribe, the Court held that Congress did not possess
the power under Article I to subject nonconsenting states to private
suits in federal court. The Court found it necessary to thus limit congressional power to preserve the constitutional balance of state and
federal power. Then, in Alden, the Court held that Congress could not
authorize, under its Article I powers, private suits against the states in
their own courts. The Court relied upon the Tenth Amendment to
extend the Eleventh Amendment, textually limited to federal courts,
to state courts; thus, the Court prevented Congress from altering the
balance of state and federal power created by the Constitution and
protected by the Tenth Amendment.
These cases effectively prevent Congress from having any constitutionally permissible means by which to enforce federal legislation, constitutionally enacted pursuant to Article I, against states.
This enforcement problem does not allow the federal government,
historically entrusted with protecting individual liberties and rights, to
effectively prevent states from violating individuals' federal rights.
Furthermore, the arguments advanced by the Court in defense of this
182 See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 760 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting, joined by
Stevens, J., Ginsburg, J., Breyer, J.) ('There is no evidence that the Tenth Amendment constitutionalized a concept of state sovereignty as inherent in the notion of statehood.... The Court's
history simply disparages the capacity of the Constitution to order relationships in a Republic
that has changed since the founding.").
183 See sources cited supranote 15.
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enforcement problem are flawed and do not justify, even if taken together, denying all practical remedies to those whose rights are violated by states.
Finally, it appears that if in fact the Court is relying upon Tenth
Amendment principles to construe the Eleventh Amendment to apply
to state courts, incorrect historical analysis is the only barrier preventing Congress from using its enumerated powers to subject nonconsenting states to private suits in their own courts. Such suits
would be more deferential to the states' dignity and sovereignty by
providing the defendant states with many protections not provided in
federal court. Therefore, it seems that by limiting the permissible
means available to Congress in enforcing its Article I powers to
authorizing private suits against states only in state courts, the Constitution's balance of power will not be significantly altered. Furthermore, this limitation will also help to clean up the exceptions that
currently dominate Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, as they will
no longer be needed to enforce federal law against states.
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